The bubbles that fuel periods of financial speculation take shape long before prices collapse. Sometimes they are mere trial balloons, but on other occasions they appear to be grounded in reality. In any case, these bubbles arise from ideas. Before accounting imbalances or credit excesses—the triggers of stock market crises—accumulate, they take root in the investment climate through a collective narrative that seeks to convince people of a radically different future in which the classic rules of asset valuation no longer apply.
Do investors tend to suffer from low self-esteem? Are they simply the target of speculative greed on the part of certain market gurus seeking profits? Do they sometimes forget to value assets in the short term, to look beyond the immediate horizon, or to take a long-term view of their investment portfolios? Quite often—and not infrequently—the answer seems to be yes, judging by the rapid spread of episodes of irrational exuberance that have occurred since the middle of the last century. The IMF, for example, has recorded 414 currency crises, 200 sovereign debt crises and 151 banking crises. Dozens of them every decade.
It is true that most are local or regional. They appear to be limited in scope. But we must not underestimate their propensity for chaos. Because there have been ten instances of financial instability on a global scale since the oil crisis, some accompanied by global recession and all by stock market crashes, such as that of the 1973–75 period and its seismic aftershocks in the 1980s. Almost without a break, the Latin American debt crisis emerged. Another period of stress with widespread geographical repercussions that lasted a long decade until the Tequila Effect was overcome, which depressed the Mexican peso and spread to the markets and several banking systems. Or Black Monday in 1987, with synchronised falls from Hong Kong to every stock exchange on the planet, and the crunch in Japan two years later, which ushered in three long decades of economic stagnation and deflation in what was then the world’s second-largest GDP.
Before the end of the 20th century, there was still time for competitive devaluations of Asian currencies to take place and, almost in parallel, that of the Russian rouble, which resulted in five prime ministers in two years before Vladimir Putin came to power.
More recent —and even more global — have been the dot-com of 2000, with origins in the US and spreading recession in Germany and the credit crisis of 2008 with the nationalisation of Lehman Brothers and suspension of trading on the Stock Exchange in Moscow due to the freefall into the depths of hell of its share price. It was like watching the world upside down: the paradise of the free market buying with federal funds a a45> bank of investment private and the former USSR preventing the collapse of trading in capital. But it was not the last major systemic crisis. The European debt crisis of 2012, which was on the verge of bury the euro, and the Great Pandemic of 2020 caused by COVID -19 also led to economic contractions.
Common themes in the story
The story that has accompanied all of them has not been exactly the same. However, it contains common threads. The narrative that takes root in the markets not only persuades the investors, but also extends into the public arena. Analysts, banks, the media and political leaders end up reaching a consensus which seems to confirm that structural change is inevitable and is underway.
The 2013 Nobel laureate in Economics, Robert Shiller, described this phenomenon as narrative economics, based on the idea that the stories circulating in society directly influence economic behaviour and investment decisions. When a narrative gains sufficient traction — whether it be a transformative technology, a new financial model or a seemingly unstoppable economic cycle — it can become the oxygen that fuels any bubble.
The warning about irrational exuberance
One of the most famous concepts associated with them emerged as an institutional warning. In 1996, Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, publicly wondered whether the financial markets were displaying “irrational exuberance that was inflating stock market valuations beyond their fundamentals”. The expression became a benchmark for understanding speculative cycles. Paradoxically, the warning did not dampen market enthusiasm. Over the following years, the Nasdaq continued to rise, driven by the tech narrative.
Until it burst, the dot-com bubble was the example most visible of how a story can dominate investor sentiment. The internet promised to radically transform the economy, eliminate intermediaries and generate new forms of productivity. Technology companies began to gain value more due to their potential rather than for their actual profitability. Shiller explained it in his a46> influential book Irrational Exuberance: “the markets can enter into dynamics collective where optimism feeds feeds back into and in which each rise confirms the dominant narrative, and that narrative continues to attract new investors”. In 2000, the Nasdaq crashed and the narrative changed with the same speed with which it had been built.
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, a widely accepted dogma also took hold: house prices were a structurally safe asset. This assumption justified an extraordinary expansion of mortgage lending. From so-called subprime loans to complex financial instruments. They were dubbed “toxic assets” and became a permanent fixture on bank balance sheets. They were vast in scale following years of excessive lending and, above all, highly dangerous due to the dubious recoverability of the loans granted. They imploded when the credit cycle began to deteriorate and the international financial architecture revealed its grave fragility.
Very few investment voices—including, amongst others, Jeremy Grantham and Nouriel Roubini—warned several months in advance that the US property market was in the grip of a bubble and that a correction was inevitable. To no avail. Because the prevailing narrative continued on its optimistic course.
Spain and the rhetoric of bricks
In Spain, the property bubble also had a very clear rhetorical dimension. Over the years, a mantra became firmly established in political speeches, industry reports and everyday conversations: that property was always a sound investment and its prices never fell. This narrative served both an economic and a cultural function. It justified a growth model based on construction and reinforced the perception of housing as the safest asset for family savings. The logic was simple and powerful: building created jobs, jobs drove demand, and demand sustained prices.
So, when the international financial crisis spread to the European banking system, that dynamic quickly faded. The once-stable engine of growth became the most serious vulnerability in the recent history of the eurozone’s fourth-largest economy.
The narrative pattern of bubbles thus follows a recurring pattern:
· Innovation or structural change: a technology or economic model emerges that promises to change the rules of the game.
· Expansion of capital and credit: markets mobilise resources to capitalise on the opportunity.
· Consolidation of the dominant narrative: analysts and the media reinforce the growth narrative.
· Decoupling of expectations and fundamentals: valuations become detached from economic reality.
· Abrupt shift in narrative: when results fail to meet expectations, the narrative is reversed.
Furthermore, on rare occasions they erupt due to a lack of information. Rather, they collapse when the narrative underpinning the optimism ceases to be credible. The new narrative—that of today’s AI—is beginning to follow in its wake. It is a technology that is transforming entire sectors, from business productivity to scientific research, and is triggering a massive wave of investment in companies involved in AI development.
To make matters worse, the voices are growing louder once again setting off the alarms once more. Top executives from firms in the investment and private banking assure that the climate for investors could be underestimating the impact of the conflict in Iran following a correction in the stock market which has become apparent on Wall Street in February, prior to the escalation of military tensions in the Middle East, due to the persistence of certain values linked to AI unleashed with excessive use of credit.
There are warnings that the market is once again functioning as a storytelling machine. And with good reason. After all, financial bubbles are not merely economic phenomena. They are also narrative phenomena. As history shows, stories are also traded.
